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KEY ROLES OF THE CORPORATE LEVEL 
 
Adrián A. Caldart* 





This paper analyzes the evolution during the period 1986-2002 of the corporate strategy of 
Lujan, a highly successful car components manufacturer headquartered in Spain, as a way to 
explore how the corporate level influences the successful evolution of a company exposed to a 
“turbulent” environment over a long period. We find that the corporate level plays three key 
roles. First, it drives a firm’s evolution by developing a cognitive representation of the firm’s 
competitive landscape. Second, it paces the company’s evolution by alternately shifting the 
balance of organizational initiatives between static efficiency-based “local search” strategies, 
chosen in times of stability or economic slowdown, and dynamic efficiency-based “long jump” 
strategies, adopted during periods of major environmental turbulence. Long-jump corporate 
strategies, carried out through limited downside strategic initiatives such as real options and 
strategic alliances (“off-line long-jumps”), are particularly frequent in these circumstances. The 
third role consists of developing an organizational architecture that frames the self-organized 
coordination of the different business divisions. The Lujan story clearly illustrates the important 
role of corporate strategy in a firm that must undergo radical transitions as a result of major 
environmental changes. 
 
*  Warwick Business School, University of Warwick 





Keywords: corporate strategy, turbulent environments, complexity theory, car components.   
 





CORPORATE STRATEGY IN TURBULENT ENVIRONMENTS:  
KEY ROLES OF THE CORPORATE LEVEL 
 
Introduction  
The issue of whether and how the corporate level contributes to competitive advantage has 
aroused fierce controversy during the last two decades. Work aimed at identifying the sources 
of corporate performance by isolating company, industry and corporate effects (Schmalensee, 
1985; Rumelt, 1991; Mc Gahan and Porter, 1997) concluded that corporate effects appeared to 
be negligible. More recently, this long-standing “truth” of strategic management has been 
challenged by studies that find material corporate effects (Brush and Bromiley, 1997; Chang 
and Singh, 2000; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). However, studies within this tradition appear to 
be strongly affected by difficult-to-fix sampling biases and methodological flaws (Brush and 
Bromiley, 1997; Chang and Singh, 2000; Bowman and Helfat, 2001; Hawawini et al., 2003). 
The creation of corporate advantage may be a phenomenon of a subtlety that cannot be 
captured by cross-sectional database statistical studies (Bowman and Helfat, 2001), making new 
methodological approaches welcome. Bowman (1995) suggested that a better understanding of 
the design issues in corporate strategy would open a possible future for the field. A step in this 
direction is found in recent work rooted in the “sciences of complexity” which asserts the 
superiority of management systems that foster the development of self-organizing processes, as 
opposed to centralized design. While “complexity theory”
1 is rooted in advances made in 
natural sciences, prominently in biology and physics, there is a growing literature by 
management scholars who propose insights derived from those advances (Levinthal, 1997; Mc 
Kelvey, 1997, 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Conner, 1998; Anderson, 1999; Boisot and 
Child, 1999; Clippinger, 1999; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Stacey et al., 2000).  
From an empirical viewpoint, we distinguish two streams of research that approach 
organizations as complex systems. Both conserve traditional organizational design theories’ 
focus on interdependencies but put the stress on the ability to manipulate these 
interdependencies, and on the performance implications of such manipulation (Brown and 
                                              
Sponsors:  We gratefully acknowledge support for this research from IESE Business School’s Anselmo Rubiralta 
Center for Globalization and Strategy.  
1 Studies that rely on the message of the complexity sciences (Bar-Yam, 1997) do not constitute a unifying theory, as 
authors diverge in the way key properties of complex systems observed in natural sciences are understood and 
researched in organizational contexts.  
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Eisenhardt, 1998; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). The first kind of studies is characterized by 
systematic analysis, based on the use of agent-based simulations. The second thread is based on 
the study of cases, aimed at observing properties of complex systems in organizational 
contexts.  
Agent-based modeling. NK simulations. The simulations thread was strongly based on a 
modeling strategy “imported” and adapted from biology: Kauffman’s NK model (Kauffman, 
1993). This model was originally developed in the field of biology as a way to describe  the 
self-organizing properties of genes and the impact of those properties on the genes’ “fitness”. It 
was adopted as a modeling strategy in organization studies with the purpose of describing how 
the complexity of an organizational design and the kind of strategic behavior followed by a 
company affect its performance or “fitness”. 
Initial contributions within this perspective (Levinthal, 1997; McKelvey, 1999; Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin, 2000) constituted a very valuable effort toward the introduction of 
systematic analysis in the discussion of organizations as complex systems. Yet, doubts arose 
with respect to the possibility of studying human organizations using tools conceived originally 
for the study of living organisms. Issues central in organizational life, such as rational choice, 
near decomposable structures, risk aversion, strategic discipline, or long-term vs. short-term 
performance, are completely neglected in these models. Later efforts successfully addressed 
some of these shortcomings, incorporating features such as Simon’s (Simon, 1996) idea of near 
decomposability (Gavetti, 1999); strategic discipline (Gavetti et al., 2003; Siggelkow and 
Levinthal, 2003; Caldart and Ricart, 2004); the impact of analogy on managers’ cognition 
(Gavetti et al., 2003); and changes in the environment (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2003).  
Case-study research. Case studies rooted in complexity theory have tended to “export” 
properties observed in complex systems in nature to the organizational world, and put the 
emphasis on optimizing interdivisional collaboration in multidivisional firms exposed to 
turbulent environments. Turbulent environments are those characterized by high levels of 
dynamism, complexity and uncertainty (Crossan, Nanjad and Vera, 2001). The idea of dynamics 
at the “edge of chaos” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Marion, 1999) gained particular currency. 
Eisenhardt and Brown (1998) point out the important role of self-organizing as a process that 
places the company “at the edge of chaos.” According to these authors, the “edge of chaos” is 
reached through a structural design that allows a balance to be struck between the paradoxical 
needs of organizations: the need for order and stability, and the need for innovation and 
creativity.  Going too far in the search for innovation and creativity results in a rule-breaking 
culture, loose structures and processes that obscure responsibilities, and excessive but 
ineffective communication, leading to the “chaos trap” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) or “error 
catastrophe.” Conversely, going too far in the search for tight structures, schedules and 
processes results in a loss of flexibility, poor innovation, and a predictable strategy, leading to 
the “bureaucracy trap” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) or a “complexity catastrophe.” At the edge 
of chaos, firms have activities that are loosely constructed but with critical structure points, a 
culture of frequent change in a context of strict rules, and channels for real-time, fact-based 
communication within and across groups. 
Another influential idea that emerged from this literature, especially in the sphere of 
multidivisional firms, was that of  “simple rules” (Pascale, 1999; Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001). 
Given the superiority of self-organizing processes, as opposed to tight control, as a way to 
release the organization’s creative forces and its sensitivity to design influences, the corporate 
center is left with the role of designing “simple rules” (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001), i.e., 
objectives or policies that frame self-organizing at the business level. Grant (2003) reinforces  
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this idea, reporting that strategic planning became less concerned with detailed action 
programs, commitments to particular projects, and resource deployments, and instead placed 
greater emphasis upon more broadly defined goals. Corporate executives are the candidates to 
perform this role, as they are more likely than others to have a broad architectural knowledge 
of the firm (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). Similarly, Stacey (1993) proposes that corporate 
management must create the context in which collaboration can happen by bringing managers 
together to talk and perhaps find collaborative opportunities. In their recent multiple case 
study, Chakravarthy et al. (2001) also suggest that the transfer of knowledge related to the 
company’s core competencies appears to be more effective when business units relate to each 
other without direct corporate intervention. Finally, Goold and Campbell (2002) propose that 
multibusiness companies be seen as “structured networks” in which corporate intervention is 
desirable only as a means to remedy the “difficult links” or coordination problems that the 
network cannot solve effectively through self-organizing. This literature highlights the need for 
a “new worldview” based on an understanding of firms as complex adaptive systems. More 
importantly, it proposes organizational arrangements that “fit” with the nature of complex 
systems and make it possible to overcome difficulties resulting from an understanding of the 
firm based on mechanistic paradigms. Previous studies concerning multidivisional firms (Goold 
and Campbell, 1987; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Markides and 
Williamson, 1996) signaled the corporate center as the unit in charge of actively searching out 
and developing inter-unit synergies. However, these kinds of “synergy creation” efforts based 
on centralized designs showed poor results in practice (Goold and Campbell, 1998). 
This paper constitutes an effort to build on this literature, focused on how value is created in 
multidivisional firms, by exploring how the corporate level influences the long-term, successful 
evolution of a multidivisional firm exposed to a highly turbulent environment for an extended 
period. For this purpose, we draw on the theoretical tradition of behavioral evolutionism (March 
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982), recently enriched by the 
abovementioned literature rooted in the complexity sciences (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999; McKelvey, 1997, 1999). To explore this issue, 
we carried out an in-depth historical case study of Lujan, a car component manufacturing firm 
headquartered in Spain that underwent radical transitions as a result of being exposed to a 
highly turbulent competitive landscape. 
The central element of this story concerns Lujan’s corporate initiatives aimed at dealing with 
the rapid changes that affected its industrial sector, the car component industry, during the 
1980s and 1990s. Many of this industry’s central business practices changed in the wake of the 
transformation in the automotive industry. During this period, Lujan undertook a spectacular 
process of international expansion, illustrated by an annual increase in sales averaging 22.3% 
from 1985 through 2000 (Figure 1). The company established a presence in 18 countries in all 
the key geographical “centers of gravity” of the car industry worldwide and increased its 
number of employees from 703 in 1985 to 6,121 in 2000. Remarkably, the company’s majority 
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Figure 1 














We framed data collection in a recently developed framework, the Corporate Strategy Triangle 
(Caldart and Ricart, 2004). This framework, discussed below, conceives that corporate strategy 
results from three key roles of the corporate level: the development of a corporate cognitive 
representation of the firm’s fitness landscape; the development of corporate strategic initiatives; 
and the development of the firm’s architectural design. We found that the contribution of 
corporate strategy to the firm’s successful transitions was crucial in all three of these roles. 
Major changes in the evolution of the car components industry triggered significant alterations 
in corporate management’s understanding of the firm’s competitive landscape. These new 
representations triggered consistent corporate strategic initiatives affecting every major division 
of the firm, and also architectural re-designs aimed at addressing turbulence by fostering and 
easing the emergence of self-organized coordination initiatives at the divisional level.  
The Corporate Strategy Triangle 
The Corporate Strategy Triangle (Caldart and Ricart, 2004) is a dynamic framework for 
corporate strategy, based on three interlinked sets of processes (Figure 2)
2. Although the 
processes influence each other, for descriptive purposes we will describe each one separately.  
 
 
                                              
2 For a more detailed discussion, see Caldart and Ricart (2004). 
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Figure 2 















Corporate management develops a representation of the firm’s fitness landscape that  drives  
the  firm’s evolution. Corporate strategic initiatives are developed in accordance with that 
representation. Through these initiatives, the corporate level paces the firm’s evolution. Finally, 
the corporate level designs the architecture of the firm, framing the evolution of the portfolio of 
businesses. 
DRIVING. Developing a cognitive representation of the firm’s business landscape.  The 
corporate level develops a cognitive representation of the business landscape and uses it to 
define the corporate value creation model, which specifies the key success factors of the firm as 
a whole. Cognitive representations have been shown to be a critical determinant of managerial 
choice and action (Fiol and Huff, 1992; Walsh, 1995). Cognition is a forward-looking form of 
intelligence that is premised on an actor’s belief about the linkage between the choice of 
actions and the subsequent impact of those actions on outcomes. Such beliefs derive from the 
actor’s mental model of the world, or “dominant logics” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986).  
PACING.  Developing corporate strategic initiatives. Based on the cognitive representation, 
organizations position themselves in their landscapes using different kinds of evolutionary 
strategies, such as incremental search, long jumps, or recombinations of resources and business 
opportunities. Search is local when the company aims at innovating within its current corporate 
model. It takes place when the set of business attributes is varied only incrementally.  
In contrast to local search, long jumps involve adopting a new corporate model. This strategy is 
characterized by high exploration but limited exploitation, and emphasizes sample variation in 
the search for dynamic efficiency. The impact of this strategy varies dramatically depending on 
whether the evaluation mechanism is one of on-line experimentation or off-line cognition 
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sample is generally an attractive property. If low outcome draws can be discarded at low cost, 
the greater variance in the sample, holding the mean constant, increases the expected value of 
the draws that are adopted, encouraging long jumps.  
A third possibility consists of recombining elements of existing partial solutions (Levinthal and 
Warglien, 1999; Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2003) by manipulating the interdependencies 
between the firm’s different activities. Entrepreneurs do not randomly sample the space of 
alternatives, but find new, unforeseen combinations of known but previously distant elements. 
Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001) propose “chartering,” a competitive process between units 
enabling recombination, or “patching” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999), of product-market domains 
between business units in response to market changes. In this way, the company obtains inter-
temporal economies of scope (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2001), arising from the replacement of old 
businesses that used a resource by a new business that uses the same resource, in response to 
changing market conditions. 
If  driving represents the corporate view of the landscape, pacing involves defining the key 
search strategy to put the corporate value creation model into action. Together they identify the 
way the corporate level adds value to the business portfolio. The architectural design closes the 
model by defining the key organizational elements to implement the value creation model. 
FRAMING. Developing the Architectural Design of the Firm. Designs with low interdependence 
keep the level of interactions low. However, flexibility comes at the expense of poor internal 
diversity (or complexity). In contrast, higher interdependence promotes organizational learning, 
as diversity of behavior rises with interdependencies, but reduces the effectiveness of 
organization-level change. Tightly coupled systems have great difficulty in adapting even to 
modest change. The more turbulent the environment, the more interdependent the architectural 
design, as the firm tries to increase internal knowledge and activity sharing. This assumption is 
consistent with Ashby’s law of requisite variety
3 and Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) Integration 
and Differentiation framework. In other words, in turbulent environments the organization 
cannot allow divisions, especially those that are related because they have common customers 
or technologies, the “luxury” of running totally autonomously, as very valuable knowledge and 
cost-sharing opportunities would be sacrificed, leading to an “error catastrophe.” However 
increasing interdependencies expose the firm to the risk of a “complexity catastrophe.” 
As seen, the organizational architecture fits the cognition and search strategy to implement the 
underlying corporate value creation model. In this architecture it is crucial to define the level of 
organizational design vs. self-organization that frames corporate strategy. 
Methods and Data 
This research is based on an in-depth, historical, inductive case study of the evolution of the 
corporate strategy of Lujan over the 16-year period from 1986 to 2002. The case provides an 
insight into how corporate strategy leads the evolution of companies facing profound 
environmental changes. We chose the case study format because of the lack of a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the evolution of corporate strategy in turbulent environments 
                                              
3 “The real key to regulation is to be able to match the variety of exogenous disturbances to the system” (Scott, 1992 
on Ashby’s law).  
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over an extended period. We judge that our longitudinal design, unlike cross-sectional cases 
and database studies, enables us to capture the richness and understand the dynamics of the 
corporate strategy process.  
Data collection. During our research project we had one sponsor, the CEO, while the Corporate 
Controller acted as a liason executive for the project.  
The data collection process was framed by the Corporate Strategy Triangle. The study involved 
14 semi-structured interviews (see Table 1) with the Chairman, the CEO, several corporate 
managers, most of whom were also members of the Board of Directors, an external board 
member, and the heads of the company’s three international divisions. Interviews took typically 
an hour and a half, with the shortest taking forty minutes and the longest lasting two hours. 
The interviews covered the following topics: 
•  Major environmental changes faced by the firm during the period studied. 
•  Evolution of the “dominant logic” at the corporate level.  
•  Main corporate strategic initiatives. 
•  Evolution of the architectural design of the firm, emphasizing especially the evolution 
of corporate-division relationships and interdivisional relationships. 
•  Evolution of the firm’s governance structure and how it impacted on the dominant logic 
at the corporate level, the kind of corporate strategic initiatives adopted, and the 
architectural design of the firm. 
•  Performance of the firm. 
 
Table 1 
Interviews at Lujan 
 
Responsibilities  No. of interviews 
Chairman of the Board  1 
CEO and Member of the Board of Directors  3 
Executive Vice-President and Member of the Board of Directors  1 
CFO and Member of the Board of Directors  1 
Corporate Human Resources Director  1 
Corporate Logistics Director  1 
External Member of the Board of Directors  1 
Corporate Controller  2 
Divisional Director Rear View Systems  1 
Divisional Director Cables and Command Systems  1 
Divisional Director Sunvisors and Pumping Systems  1 
 
Notes were taken during the interviews and full reports were written up immediately after each 
interview.  
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In addition to interviews, we obtained documentary information from the company, including 
strategic plans, annual reports, institutional brochures and promotional films. Finally, we 
gathered public information from the company’s website, the Spanish business press, business 
databases, publications specialized in the car and component industries, and a teaching case 
study on the company. The CEO and the corporate controller and his staff provided additional 
information by e-mail or telephone when further clarification was required. Finally, after the 
study was finished, major ideas derived from the case were discussed with the CEO, who 
provided comments.   
Given the characteristics of our research interest, we chose a holistic approach (Yin, 1989), 
taking the company as a whole as the unit of analysis. 
For this purpose, first, we briefly review Lujan’s history from its creation through 1986. Second, 
we account for the evolution in the company’s corporate strategy during the period covered by 
the fieldwork (1986-2002), explaining how the corporate level reframed the company’s 
environment and identifying the key strategic and organizational initiatives it led.  
Corporate Evolution at Lujan 
Origins of Lujan  1949-1985 
After the end of World War II,  Spain suffered an international economic embargo against the 
Franco regime. Because the country had no automobile industry of its own, isolation led to a 
severe shortage of spare parts for cars. This created an opportunity for local companies to enter 
this business by substituting imports. In this context, in 1949 Mr. Joan Roig and his brother-in-
law, Pere Feliú, founded a small firm, Lujan, with the purpose of supplying brake, clutch and 
speedometer cables for used cars. In the ’50s, the Spanish state created two companies to 
produce cars and trucks, thus boosting the national demand for car components. Lujan seized 
this opportunity to expand its business by becoming a supplier for new automobiles and trucks. 
As it was in close contact with its customers, Lujan noticed the car manufacturers’ additional 
needs and expanded its product line beyond the cable business. In this way, Mr. Roig and Mr. 
Feliu soon had a group of companies under their control, producing windscreen wipers, 
rearview mirrors, sun-visors and window handles.  
The organization was strongly centralized, with CEO Mr. Roig making all the strategic and 
marketing decisions concerning the different businesses, with only operational management 
being decentralized. However, as the company grew, Mr. Roig realized that his holding 
responsibility for most business policy decisions was creating increasingly serious bottlenecks 
at the top of the company. Consequently, in 1976 Lujan became a holding company, acting as 
the corporate center of a multidivisional group, to which it provided commercial, financial, 
administrative, legal and economic services. Roig delegated all business decisions to the 
managers of the different companies, who from then on operated with a high degree of 
autonomy.   
In 1986, Lujan was the leader of the Spanish cable, windscreen wiper and rearview mirror 
market. Thanks to protectionist Spanish legislation, the company faced no significant 
international competition. Regarding the key success factors of Lujan during these years, one of 
the senior managers interviewed stated, “in those years fluid commercial relationships were all 
that mattered. Quality was not a key issue, even price wasn’t. And we copied designs from  
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major firms operating in Europe, especially the Germans.” Lujan’s corporate strategy up until 
1986 can be characterized using the Corporate Strategy Triangle (Table 1).  
 
Table 2 
Lujan’s Corporate Strategy Triangle before 1986 
 
 
Next, we will discuss Lujan’s evolution during the 16-year period (1986-2002) covered by the 
study. This period can be divided in three stages, each characterized by a major strategic shift 
in the firm’s corporate strategy that led to major changes in the scope of Lujan’s business, 
its product mix, its key resources, and its basic technical capabilities, as well as in its 
organizational structure and processes.  
 
Becoming European (1986-1995) 
The first major shift in Lujan’s corporate strategy began in 1986 and lasted for nearly a decade. 
This process of change will be discussed in terms of the three building blocks of corporate 
strategy described in the Corporate Strategy Triangle.  
Corporate cognitive representation. On January 1, 1986, a significant event drastically and 
definitively changed the Spanish economy: Spain joined the EEC. This was the beginning of the 
end of Spain’s isolation from Europe. Besides this regulatory breakthrough, which exposed 
Lujan to international competition, the auto components industry also had been undergoing 
important changes since the late seventies and early eighties.  
Traditionally, European car manufacturers had developed their components in the countries 
where they manufactured their vehicles. In the late seventies, however, this practice began to 
change. Car manufacturers began to centralize component development in their regional 
headquarters. They also gradually stopped developing the components entirely themselves; 
Cognitive Representation 
DRIVING 




Lujan at highest peak 
Industry’s market scope is national. 
 
Key success factors in Spain: 
Close commercial relationships. 
 
No strong customer pressure on cost 
or quality. 
 
Low competitive intensity. 
Incremental local search 
Geographic scope: Spain and 
Portugal. 
 
Market scope: all car manufacturers 
operating in Spain. 
 
Product scope: cables, windshield 
wipers, sunvisors, mirrors. 
 
Growth through market penetration 
and product development.   
 
Technological dependence on  
partners  
High autonomy 
Divisionalized. “Strategic control” 
corporate style.  
 
Operations and Marketing & Sales 
decentralized in small autonomous 
business units. 
 
Quantitative control measures appear 
but budget culture lacking. 
 
Corporate functions: finance, 
administration, legal, commercial 
advice to units (at their request).  
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instead, they started to share the development effort and costs with component manufacturers. 
This meant that the car makers’ traditional policy of working with a large number of national 
suppliers, selected on a short-term basis, was replaced by a policy of dealing with a smaller 
number of more highly specialized suppliers, working under  long-term agreements.  
In light of this trend, Lujan’s Chairman and then also CEO, Mr. Roig, understood that, from then 
on, the natural market space for leading European companies was no longer their home 
countries, but the whole of the EU. This was the case for several reasons: First, the 
centralization of the car manufacturers’ component design and development decisions meant 
that component suppliers would have to have a presence close to the decision centers, which 
were located primarily in Germany, UK, France and Italy. Second, to position itself as a partner 
of car companies’ long-term component development programs, a component supplier would 
need to have an image of technological strength – and because technology development 
required heavy investments, it could only be afforded by firms with a large market scope. Third, 
European deregulation was expected to facilitate pan-European business and remove trade 
barriers designed to protect national players. 
These environmental changes wiped out Lujan’s main advantages as a tier-one supplier to 
Spanish automobile plants: once component design and development decisions began to be 
made near the car companies’ headquarters outside Spain, Lujan’s strong local commercial 
relationships in Spain were no longer critical. What was more, its previous position as “King of 
Spain”
4 in the components industry would be threatened by EU deregulation in 1993. 
To hold on to its tier-one supplier status, Lujan would have to build a presence in the 
automotive industry’s European decision centers, where as yet it was completely unrepresented, 
and combine competitive costs with an ability to become a technology developer. For Lujan, 
expanding into Europe from Spain entailed many challenges. First, it would require a huge 
financial effort, particularly for a privately held company with a turnover of only 37 million 
euros. Second, there would have to be a change in the organization’s mindset, from being a 
technology follower to being its customers’ technology partner. Third, the company would have 
to absorb the organizational and cultural impact of becoming a multinational and competing in 
countries with highly dynamic business environments. Finally, Lujan would have to rebuild all 
of its customer relationships virtually from scratch, as it had barely had commercial relations 
with the car makers’ European headquarters in the past. 
Mr Roig, Chairman of Lujan, explained how this positioning dilemma was presented: 
“In June 1986, during a shareholders’ meeting, I proposed three alternatives: First, 
concentrate on the Spanish market, with the prospect of continued high earnings and 
dividends for a while until the company eventually disappeared, within 7 to 10 years at 
most. Second, divest now by selling the company to one of the several international 
competitors that were offering to buy it. Third, engage in a process of European 
expansion, in line with the new logic of the car business, and become a truly 
European company.”  
 
                                              
4  An expression used by one interviewee.  
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Corporate strategic initiatives. The controlling shareholders decided to engage in a European 
expansion plan. Mr Roig commented that “we realized the need to battle for at least five or six 
years in Europe, before knowing whether this strategy would lead us to success or to a 
definitive failure. This uncertainty led some of our minority shareholders to sell their 
participations before we began our expansion in Europe.” The new corporate vision was given 
expression in an international expansion plan aimed at positioning the company as a major 
European component manufacturer for all its product lines. For this purpose, the company had 
to get close to the big European manufacturers’ decision centers. The tactic was to open 
Engineering Centers in each target country, led by native engineers hired “ad hoc,” with the 
purpose of building the company’s reputation as an innovative European manufacturer. The 
Chairman remembered that “we had to overcome the negative image that Spanish products 
tended to have in Europe in those days if we wanted to convince customers that we could 
become their technology partners.” The purpose of the Engineering Centers was to establish 
strong relationships with the car manufacturers’ R&D centers. Only once this process was 
successful and contracts with the customer began to be agreed would Lujan consider beginning 
operations at the site. Thus, Lujan opened an Engineering Center in London in 1987 and a 
factory in Birmingham one year later. 
In 1988 Lujan opened its second Engineering Center in Germany, to conduct dealings with the 
German manufacturers. That same year Lujan opened a third Engineering Center in France and 
bought 50% of a local rearview mirror manufacturer, as French customers particularly 
appreciated suppliers with operations in the country. 
After less than two years, Lujan was already present in three out of four key European areas 
(the exception was Italy) and had operations in two of them. 
Architectural design. During these years, the company pursued strong organic growth, based on 
opening foreign subsidiaries and expanding operations in Spain in order to meet the increasing 
demand. Marketing and engineering structures were modified to create multi-country structures 
to market the company’s products and provide engineering services in each country. No major 
standardization or restructuring efforts were promoted by the corporate center, and the strong 
commitment to divisional autonomy remained unchanged. Accordingly, each division 
developed its own systems and structure, based on its managers’ views, and managed its own 
financial resources. The CEO reported that “divisions’ practices were the projection of the 
idiosyncrasy of the divisional VPs. Beyond some broad indications coming from the corporate 
level, such as the need to expand in Europe and to increase quality and customer service, they 
behaved as if they were independent companies.” Divisional autonomy was a feature on which 
Lujan prided itself. Its Chairman stated that autonomy was crucial, as “responsibility cannot 
exist without freedom.” 
The corporate style evolved with moderation. Control was based primarily on the monitoring of 
revenue figures. Budgets were prepared, but just as a general indication of targets, and were not 
subject to budgetary control. This situation changed in the early ’90s, when the company 
gradually implemented a budgetary control system, though focused mostly on income 
statement accounts. Control still relied heavily on informal mechanisms, such as Mr. Roig’s 
visits to the plants. Moreover, the cables and mirror divisions were led by Mr. Roig and Mr. 
Feliu’s elder sons, reinforcing the controlling families’ involvement in management.   
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Going Global (1995-2000) 
Corporate cognition. In 1995, Lujan’s corporate management was still focused on the goal of 
consolidating the company as a major European technological partner of the car manufacturers. 
However, new developments taking place in the car and component industries gave rise to 
internal controversies about the soundness of the current framing of the competitive landscape.  
Since the beginning of the ’90s, competition among car manufacturers had been tough. The 
struggle among manufacturers to establish a global position led the industry to a situation of 
overcapacity, a particularly serious problem for an already mature, low-margin business. In the 
aftermath of excessive capacity building came a huge wave of industry consolidation that left 
the world market in the hands of a handful of firms. Manufacturers adopted revolutionary new 
initiatives aimed at achieving sharp cost reductions. As components accounted for between 
60% and 70% of the cost of a new car, trimming the cost of supplies became the 
manufacturers’ central concern. With that purpose, they began to operate under the concept of 
“global platforms.” The idea was to cluster all of the different car models into “families” of 
similar models, build each family on a single common platform, and market the same models 
all over the world. This revolutionary concept increased the manufacturers’ ability to share 
resources and components between models, consequently reducing costs. Gradually all the 
companies joined the trend to develop platforms and globalize their models. Additionally, car 
companies developed global sourcing policies and forced component manufacturers to produce 
complete systems instead of single components or sub-assemblies. This change permitted car 
manufacturers to lower costs by transferring several component development and assembly 
engineering costs to their suppliers and reducing the number of suppliers required for each 
model.  
Technologically, electronics and information technology were becoming increasingly important 
and were expected to replace many mechanical and electrical functions of cars.   
The car manufacturers’ global sourcing policy and their willingness to rely on a smaller number 
of suppliers created competitive advantages for component manufacturers that were capable of 
supplying the manufacturers’ assembly plants in any part of the world. This put pressure on 
component manufacturers to acquire a presence in all the high-volume or high-growth regions 
of the car business, triggering a process of industry consolidation and the formation of many 
alliances in the sector
5. Tier 1 suppliers evolved towards the concept of “full-service suppliers.” 
These firms were typically chosen three years in advance of the launch of a new model and 
were responsible for the design and development of prototypes of the systems they were 
contracted to supply. They were expected to guarantee the production of components until the 
manufacturer retired the model from the market. 
Additionally, the components industry was affected by new legislation on safety (opening a 
window of opportunity for new products such as airbags or lumbar systems) and environmental 
issues, forcing companies to retire certain raw materials, such as PVC.  
New trends in the market appeared to show that the globalization of the industry was the next 
challenge for tier 1 component manufacturers. One interviewee remarked, “however, there were 
                                              
5 Lujan’s six main European competitors during the eighties no longer existed in the nineties, as all of them had been 
acquired by major American companies.  
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many respected voices in the component industry claiming that keeping only a European 
business scope would still be a strong positioning for European firms.”   
Although its European expansion was not yet complete, Lujan’s top management received 
several suggestions from its customers regarding the need for another change of direction. By 
the mid-90s, Lujan was signing contracts with European customers to supply plants located in 
Mexico producing for the European market. Lujan’s Chairman and other members of the top 
management concluded that, if it was incapable of serving these kinds of overseas orders, in the 
long run not only would car manufacturers stop offering it such opportunities, but also its 
competitive position in Europe could be in jeopardy. Global competitors’ size would give them 
a critical cost advantage, due to having operations in low labor cost locations, and economies 
of scale in R&D and procurement. Also, manufacturers from the fast-growing East European 
market had started to solicit the company’s services. Lujan’s corporate management realized 
that global presence was the only way to hold on to its “tier 1” supplier status, which was a 
strong corporate objective, and so decided to embark on a new geographical expansion plan in 
order to follow their existing customers’ global expansion and win new customers worldwide.   
Corporate strategic initiatives. Lujan’s repositioning was aimed at developing a presence in the 
two geographical areas that made up the “heart” of the car industry besides Europe – NAFTA 
and Japan – and in markets with strong growth potential such as Mercosur, India, Korea and 
China. Lujan’s goal was to become one of the three global leaders in the lines of business in 
which it operated.  
After assessing several alternatives for positioning within NAFTA, in 1995 Lujan opened a 
small sales office in Detroit, USA, and began its operations by renting a small plant in 
Monterrey, Mexico, the NAFTA country with the lowest production cost and highest market 
growth potential. Two years later, significant business growth persuaded the company to build 
its own plant and convert the Detroit sales office into an Engineering Center. Two years later, a 
second plant was opened in Monterrey and the Engineering Center was further expanded.  
In India, Lujan entered into a joint venture with a local holding company in 1997, hoping to 
exploit the huge market potential that an emerging India offered. The joint venture was 
expected to supply components to a division of the Indian holding company and to 
international manufacturers operating in India. 
In Japan, Lujan opened a Sales and Engineering Center in 1997. As access to the market was 
hampered by the “keiretsu” structure of the industry, Lujan formed alliances with four local 
companies manufacturing mirrors, cables, brake systems and plastics. Lujan marketed its 
Japanese partners’ products outside Japan, while they marketed Lujan’s products in Japan.  
In 1999, Lujan entered the Asia-Pacific region by acquiring an equity stake in a components 
manufacturer in South Korea, with the aim of supplying the big car manufacturers. 
In Mercosur, most of the best positioned car companies were already Lujan’s customers and 
were expected to manufacture the global platforms for their latest small and medium-sized 
models in that area. Accordingly, in 1996, Lujan formed a joint venture in Brazil with a local 
firm and set up a plant for its three international lines of business. In 1998, the company 
became a fully owned subsidiary of Lujan and led the Brazilian market for rearview mirrors. In 
Argentina, Lujan acquired a controlling 55% stake in a local component manufacturer in 1997.  
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 In 1999, Lujan expanded its European mirror business by acquiring a German manufacturer of 
mirrors for buses and industrial vehicles. 
In early 2000, in a major new move, Lujan acquired the Mirrors Division of one of its major 
European competitors, the biggest acquisition in the company’s history, representing an 
investment of roughly 60 million euros. This made Lujan the third largest producer of rearview 
mirrors in the world
6 and gave it a manufacturing presence in Italy (the only important 
European location in which it had not yet established itself), France, Spain, Poland, Brazil, 
Argentina, India and Turkey.  
Architectural design. The company retained its divisional structure, with highly empowered and 
independent divisions. However, international growth led top management to make major 
changes in the relationship between the corporate center and the business units by introducing 
a highly formal system of planning and control. There were also changes in corporate 
governance, with the inclusion of external directors on the Board.   
The increase in the number and location of facilities made it impossible to carry on using the 
“taking a glance”-based control system, and standardization became the obvious solution
7. The 
company developed an integrated reporting system, designed to simplify corporate evaluation 
of the divisions. During 1995 and 1996, the corporate objective was to “become someone in the 
global market, and therefore, increasing revenues became the main divisional objective.”
8 A 
reform of the Board of Directors in 1998 made controls more rigorous and granular. In 1998, 
Lujan made its system of Planning and Control much more sophisticated. Budgetary control 
techniques were implemented that took into account not only financial results but also the 
growth of key balance sheet items and cash flows. Financial Management was restructured to 
give it an international profile, and long-term financing decisions were given a strategic status 
they had not had in the past. Divisions were framed as parts of a portfolio, according to their 
cash/growth profile. From that point on, the divisions lost control over their funds and could 
retain them only by “arguing their case” for investment in an internal competition for capital 
against the other units. “From then on, poor performers in cash generation got corporate 
support only if their mid-term strategy was very clear and performance expectations were 
satisfactory,” said the CFO and Member of the Executive Committee. 
The company’s governance structure also evolved substantially. Traditionally, Lujan’s Board 
met only once a year and was made up entirely of inside directors and members of the 
controlling families. The beginning of the global strategy in 1995 brought profound changes in 
the Board. Lujan became aware of its lack of expertise in international finance and hired two 
external directors who were specialists in this field. The Executive Vice-President reported that 
“we appointed the new CFO, with a strong background in corporate banking, and two of our 
financial advisors as Board Members, as we realized that we knew a lot about the car industry, 
but very little about international finance, a matter we couldn’t neglect as a company willing to 
play in the global arena.” 
The entry of two private equity firms as partners, in 1997 and 1999, each with roughly 7% of 
the capital, reinforced the presence of external directors and the financial bias of the Board. 
                                              
6 In fact, the acquisition put the company in first place in the world market, but two mergers between global 
competitors that took place shortly afterwards left Lujan in third place.  
7 In 2000, the Rearview Systems division alone had 14 plants in 8 countries. 
8 Statement by Lujan’s Executive VP.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 15 
Additionally, an Executive Committee was created in 1998 to monitor the company’s 
performance on a monthly basis.  
Getting Tighter (2000-2002) 
Corporate cognition. The already tight situation of the low-growth car industry got even tighter 
as a result of the global economic slowdown that began in 2000. Industry sales stalled and a 
contraction of 5% was expected for 2002. In 2002, only China and Eastern Europe were 
expected to offer growth opportunities in the near future. In this context, car manufacturers 
redoubled their pressure on component manufacturers to cut costs, take on most of the 
responsibility for R&D, and build larger amounts of complete component parts. Without 
exception, vehicle manufacturers were taking steps to reduce their total number of suppliers.  
Already operating with low margins, component companies responded to these developments 
by increasing their production of modular systems, intensifying their global reach, doing their 
best to recoup heavy R&D costs, investing in high-tech or unique components, and diversifying 
towards the aftermarket. The sector was expected to undergo a fresh round of consolidation, 
leading to an industry configuration characterized by concentration in a small number of 
powerful component giants. Tier 2 and tier 3 firms were expected to be the ones most exposed 
to the sales squeeze of the early 2000s and many of them were expected to disappear. In Europe 
in particular, a number of key automotive suppliers were showing signs of financial strain, 
triggering significant internal reorganization and, in certain cases, dramatic restructurings 
(Valsan, 2004). 
In this context, Lujan began another major strategic shift. After a decade and a half of steady 
sales growth, and with its global expansion plan still unfinished, the company put margin 
strengthening at the top of the agenda, leaving the global expansion plan “on hold”. 
Corporate Strategic Initiatives. In a market tending towards concentration in a handful of big 
global players, this vision would demand slashing costs and developing new, exclusive, R&D-
based, high-price products to escape from commoditization.   
 In 2000 the company acquired complete ownership of its rearview mirrors joint venture in 
France, in order to have better strategic control, and bought a small French company that 
produced window washers and that had a small subsidiary in Slovenia, a location that 
interested Lujan because of its low labor cost and the increasing presence of car manufacturers. 
The Polish and Turkish operations were further developed in order to move low-value-added 
production from Spain to these low-labor-cost countries. For the same purpose, the company 
started up a small operation in Romania. 
Lujan took its first step in the booming Chinese market, with the aim of developing operations 
in Asia to supply its regional customers. In 2002, it signed a technical cooperation agreement 
with the second largest Chinese manufacturer of rearview mirrors. Lujan also acquired a four-
year call option on 70% of the Chinese company’s shares. 
Aiming to develop future high-value growth opportunities, Lujan created two new lines of 
business. The first was the Aftermarket Division, whose purpose was to capture the potential 
of the retail business after its expected deregulation. The second was the development, through 
a strategic alliance, of an R&D line in fractal antennas, designed to concentrate all of the 
vehicle’s communications needs in a single small antenna.   
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Architectural design. This third shift in Lujan’s corporate strategy during the period under study 
had a much greater impact on its architectural design than the previous two, as the need for 
cost-cutting led the corporate office to prioritize synergy development, even if partly at the 
expense of the life-long philosophy in favor of a high degree of divisional autonomy. Diversity 
of systems, structures and procedures had multiplied with organic growth and, particularly, 
with acquisitions. Significant cost-cutting opportunities resulting from cross-business 
collaboration became apparent. A corporate director reported that divisions were “projections of 
the idiosyncrasy of the Divisional VPs. They were run as independent companies and, although 
today’s corporate practices made their behavior more uniform, they still had very different 
business cultures.” Accordingly, the corporate center launched a series of organizational 
changes with the objective of exploiting potential synergies, while at the same time preserving 
the “small company” culture that had contributed so much to Lujan’s development. The CEO 
stated that the challenge was to achieve this objective “keeping our creativity, agility and 
competitiveness intact, preventing us from becoming an arrogant and bureaucratic 
conglomerate.” The Chairman showed a similar concern regarding this issue. 
A matrix structure was developed in all the international divisions. Business units, grouped 
either by product or by customer decision center, became responsible for business strategy, 
revenues, and return. Four global functional units were responsible for optimizing their areas of 
speciality: Operations, Technical (Engineering and R&D), Purchasing, and Quality. Business unit 
and functional directors had worldwide responsibility. Each project, e.g. a long-term contract 
with a customer, was assigned to a Project Team. In 2000, Lujan began to implement 
individual, per-project income statements to increase the visibility of the return on all projects 
and so improve resource allocation and performance control.  
A Human Resources Department was created at the corporate level to pursue corporate-wide 
initiatives, mainly to do with standardization of procedures, developing uniform salary scales 
across divisions, formal recruiting processes, career and development plans, policies for 
expatriates, and improved communications. Until then, Human Resources had been a 
responsibility of the divisions and had carried out only administrative functions.  
Procurement was centralized as a corporate function in an effort to obtain scale economies and, 
more importantly, a policy of global sourcing was adopted. Lujan’s Chairman noted that “we 
could not claim to be a global company and have 70% of our supplies coming from 50km 
around our headquarters.” For similar reasons, a new Logistics Department was created at the 
corporate level. The Logistics Director reported that “this allowed us to save many 
transportation costs, such as the cost of urgent air delivery, which had been usual in the past 
due to lack of effective coordination. It also helped to relieve the big plants in Spain from the 
task of managing the logistics of other plants worldwide, which had led to frequent disputes 
between plants.”  
The R&D function had also traditionally been performed by the divisions. The inter-unit 
Technology Committee proposed that the Cables Division’s multi-country R&D structure be used 
to help Rearview Mirrors decentralize the R&D functions that required most customer contact, 
namely project management and development engineering, while the functions that did not 
demand close interaction with customers, accounting for 60% of total R&D costs, were 
centralized in the industrial headquarters in Barcelona. R&D was expected to be crucial, as  
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major car components were expected to shift from a focus on electromechanics to a focus on 
electronics
9 and IT. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to explore how corporate strategy can contribute to the success 
of a company exposed to a turbulent environment over a long period. While previous work 
based on case studies in multidivisional organizations put the stress on value creation based on  
architectural design initiatives, especially fostering self-organized designs, little emphasis has 
been devoted to understanding the contribution of the other two important roles depicted in the 
Corporate Strategy Triangle: cognition at the corporate level, and corporate strategic initiatives. 
The main features of Lujan’s successful transit through the several, profound changes affecting 
its environment during the last sixteen years show that the Triangle framework is a good lens 
through which to examine the long-term dynamics of corporate strategy. Tables 2, 3 and 4 
synthesize the main features of Lujan’s corporate strategy triangle for each of the three stages 
identified in our study. 
 
Table 3 





















                                              
9 The electronic content of a new vehicle was expected to rise to 40% in 2010, compared to 22% in 2000. 
Cognitive Representation 
DRIVING 





Lujan’s competitive position 
eroded. 
“peak in the fitness landscape loses 
height” 
 
Spain’s accession to the EU slashes 
legal barriers to entry. 
 
Customers concentrate purchases in 
European HQ. 
 
Customer pressures for 
cost/quality/service increase. 
 
Need to become technology partner. 
(image) 
 
Need to develop European presence. 
 
Broadly: need to become a 
European company and technology 
partner of OEMs. “Off-line” long 
jumps. 
 
Entry into France, Germany, UK. 
 
Market scope: car companies 
headquartered in Europe. 
 
Product scope: cables, mirrors, 
windshield wipers, sunvisors, locking 
systems. 
 
Growth through market and product 
development. 
 
Technological learning from partners.  
 
High divisional autonomy.    
 
Multi-country engineering and 
marketing structures. 
 
Divisional discretion for strategy, 




    Budgetary control on income    
    statements. 
    Divisional leadership by family  
    members.  
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Table 4 








Lujan’s European positioning 
endangered by globalization of car 
industry (peak loses height).  
 
Car industry develops “global platforms” 
and pressure for cost slash. Traditional 
product margins slump. 
Component R&D weighted towards 
suppliers. Focus on electronics. 
Systems replace components. “Full-
service suppliers.” 
Need for scale in purchasing and R&D 
leads component industry toward global 
positioning. 
Consolidation in car and component 
industries. 
Regulation on safety and pollution. 
Global company and technology 
partner. “Off-line” long jumps. 
 
Geographic scope: entry into Mexico, 
USA, Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Poland, 
Turkey, Korea, Japan and India. 
Market scope: car companies operating 
in strategic or high-growth car industry 
markets. 
Product scope:  systems tend to replace 
components – gearshift systems, 
rearview systems, lumbar systems, 
brake systems, windshield wipers, 
sunvisors, locking systems.  
Growth: through product development 
(worldwide) and market development 
(outside Europe). 
Proprietary R&D in the three 
international divisions. 
High divisional autonomy with higher 
central coordination 
 
Formalized planning and control 
system. 
 
Businesses seen as portfolio (BCG 
matrix). Resource allocation is 
centralized. “Strategic control style.” 
Private equity firms as minority 
partners. 












Keep current representation, but 
focus on static efficiency.   
 
Global business. 
Economic slowdown reinforces cost 
pressures. 
Systems R&D increasingly in hands of 
component manufacturers. 
Consolidation aimed at getting global 
scale in purchasing and R&D. 
Tier 2 and 3 firms in serious danger of 
disappearance. 
European component firms under 
financial strain. 
Local search. Fcus on synergy and 
differentiation 
 
Geographic scope: unchanged. Call 
option on a plant  in China. 
Market scope: unchanged. 
Product scope: High R&D bet toward 
new, highly differentiated products 
within current business lines. 
Research in fractal antenna technology 
(potential new line). 
Growth: market development (retailers 
or “aftermarket”) and penetration in 
NAFTA and Asia.  
Reorganization of operations in low-cost 





Creation of new corporate functions: 
Purchasing, Logistics, HR. 
Centralization of early stages of  R&D in 
one location for the three international 
divisions. 
Adoption of a matrix organization 
(business unit/function). 
Inter-unit committees for knowledge 
sharing in operations, technology, 
quality and purchasing. 
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Corporate Cognition. DRIVING corporate strategy 
As seen in Tables 2 and 3, the company substantially shifted its “view of the world” three times 
during the sixteen-year period covered by the study. By 1986 it acknowledged the decreasing 
value of its competitive position in its effort to keep its “tier 1” manufacturer status. 
Repositioning itself to be near the European headquarters of car manufacturers became 
mandatory in the context of West European economic unification and the car makers’ tendency 
to concentrate purchasing decisions and component development in their headquarters. 
Moreover, technological strength became a key success factor in light of the new business 
trends, characterized by long-term purchase agreements, including joint development projects 
between component manufacturers and car makers. In 1995, the globalization of the car 
industry and the increasing pressure on suppliers to reduce costs led Lujan’s top managers to 
conclude that global presence and world-class R&D would be crucial for Lujan’s survival as a 
tier 1 component supplier.  
In the last period, beginning in 2000, the third and final shift was characterized by a strong 
change in Lujan’s agenda from a focus on developing an international market share “at any 
cost” to a new priority for consolidation of the organization and margin strengthening through 
R&D and cost cutting, notably capturing synergies (Table 4). An external board member who 
promoted very strongly the need for this strategic shift commented, “it is extraordinarily 
difficult to make middle managers from the divisions understand this change in Lujan’s 
priorities after a decade and a half of very aggressive commercial expansion. They just keep on 
bringing proposals to expand business and gain market share, and don’t focus easily on the 
need to stop growing and focus on margins.”  
Corporate strategic initiatives. PACING the corporate strategy 
During the first two of the three stages described in our story, the corporate level promoted 
strategic initiatives characterized by Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) as “long jumps” (Tables 2 and 
3). Long jumps involve major alterations of the business model, aimed at achieving “dynamic 
efficiency” (Ghemawat and Ricart, 1993).  
The long-jump pace promoted by Lujan was reflected in the company’s positioning through the 
development of multiple small strategic bets, which were gradually augmented as promising 
results unfolded. This allowed the company to discard low-outcome moves costlessly, or at a 
low cost, constituting “off-line long jumps” (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). The company 
adopted this strategy in order to absorb complexity (Boisot and Child, 1999), engaging in 
multiple real options, particularly those that fit the definition of “corporate growth options” 
(Trigeorgis, 1996). Corporate growth options that set the path of future opportunities are of 
considerable strategic importance. Early investments can be seen as prerequisites or links in a chain 
of interrelated projects. The infrastructure and experience generated may serve as a springboard for 
developing future business opportunities.  
During the period 1986-1995, the building of commercial relationships with car manufacturers 
across Europe that could benefit every business unit in the future and the opening of new 
plants for single product lines, with the possibility of extending the range of products in the 
future, are examples of Lujan’s intuitive application of this idea. The gradual increases in the 
company’s position in the United Kingdom, Germany and France, thanks to successful market 
penetration, show how the company “exercised” these successful growth options. These “off-
line long-jumps” enabled the company to deal with increasing environmental variety, which in  
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the case of Lujan meant facing more new competitors and dealing with more varied and more 
sophisticated customers, as a result of internationalization and new product development. 
Moreover, fierce competition prompted the company to upgrade the competitiveness of internal 
processes that previously had not been considered critical, such as procurement, internal and 
external logistics, R&D, and corporate finance.  
A second long-jump based on “off-line” strategic moves began around 1995. The scope of the 
company’s geographical market shifted yet again towards the development of a global position, 
with new operations and engineering centers in NAFTA, Mercosur, Korea and India and 
commercial agreements in Japan. During this period, the strategy of complexity absorption 
through multiple and varied initiatives was intensified, thanks to the development of new real 
options and several joint ventures. Entry into the US, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina was gradual 
and subject to unfolding events, i.e. market penetration, constituting new corporate growth 
options. Additionally, the multi-plants in Brazil and Mexico are examples of options to switch 
use (Trigeorgis, 1996). They provide a valuable built-in flexibility to switch from the current set of 
operations to new combinations in the future. 
Lujan also engaged in several joint ventures. The alliances in Korea and India represented low-
cost bets aimed at absorbing complexity through local partners with local market knowledge, 
while Lujan provided technological know-how and key international commercial relationships. 
In the past, Lujan had played this role in its alliances with international companies entering the 
Spanish market. This shift in its partnership roles reflects the extent of the company’s 
qualitative evolution.  
The acquisition, in early 2000, of the Mirrors Division of a major European competitor marks 
the transition between this period of long jumps and the subsequent stage focused on strategic 
initiatives characterized by an incremental local search aimed at achieving static efficiency. On 
the one hand, with this major acquisition the company developed new corporate growth 
options, thank to its entry into Poland, a beachhead for the fast-growing East European market, 
and Turkey, another fast-growing, low-cost area. At the same time, the acquisition allowed the 
company to obtain worldwide leadership status in the mirrors business, consolidating its 
position in Europe (Italy, France and Spain) and Mercosur (Brazil and Argentina). Rapid market 
share gains eased the development of economies of scale in purchasing and R&D.  Other 
acquisitions made after 2000 were specially focused on static efficiency, as illustrated by the 
purchase of the rearview mirrors joint venture in France, with the manifest purpose of securing 
better strategic control over operations; or likewise, the setting up of new operations in 
Romania and the reorganization of operations by moving production from the European Union 
to  Poland and Turkey to take advantage of low-cost locations. Still, despite the new focus 
aimed at dealing with the environmental pressure to lower costs, the company still engaged in 
minor “off-line” long-jumps, such as the acquisition of the call option on a mirrors 
manufacturer in China and the establishment of an R&D alliance to develop fractal antennas 
show.  
It must be stressed that the corporate move towards a “local search” bias did not come after the 
company had completed its global expansion but in the middle of the process. Interviewees 
agreed that the company’s global positioning could not be considered complete until Lujan had 
built up operations in the US and China, both unrealized objectives of Lujan’s plan to become a 
global firm. However, the combination of a huge expansion effort and the global economic 
slowdown led the company to grind to a halt and focus on strengthening margins at the 
expense of fast growth. Also, Lujan’s situation was common to most major European  
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competitors by 2002 (Valsan, 2004)
10, suggesting that the company was not losing competitive 
momentum as a result of its need to refocus around static efficiency. 
Architectural design. FRAMING corporate strategy 
Our study of Lujan’s initiatives regarding architectural design led us to develop a model of 
architectural design in turbulent environments.  
Lujan’s spectacular growth during the period 1986-1999 came at the expense of tolerating 
significant organizational inefficiencies, as the corporate focus was set on aggressively gaining 
market share “as the only possible path to secure survival,” as one board member put it. By the 
late nineties, however, the company began to pay attention to its internal organization for two 
reasons: first, it needed to formalize its processes in order to prevent a “chaos trap” (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998) that could arise if its traditionally highly organic managerial style was kept. 
The trend in companies towards increasing formalization as a result of growth has been 
extensively acknowledged in the management literature (Drucker; 1954, Mintzberg, 1983). 
Lujan’s reported gradual sophistication and standardization of its corporate performance and 
control and information systems and the development of corporate human resources policies 
served this purpose, as did the switch to a matrix type of organization in the three international 
units. Second, by 2000 the global economic slowdown obliged the company to slow its “long-
jump” towards a global position, and concentrate on margin strengthening to compete in a 
stagnant market. That is why the company engaged in strong “static efficiency”-type initiatives, 
which were particularly evident in processes such as procurement, logistics and R&D, and in the 
development of granular metrics for project control.  
Through an analysis of the high-profile organizational initiatives that took place after 1999, we 
can identify several features of Lujan’s corporate-level architectural design initiatives: the 
promotion of modular design, the development of standardized processes across divisions, the 
promotion of recombinations of resources and business opportunities, the development of 
channels for interdivisional collaboration, and the adoption of performance metrics consistent 
with corporate priorities. We consider these five characteristics, already identified and discussed 
in the literature, as the “building blocks” of a coherent management system, promoted by the 
corporate level.  
Modular design. Modularity enhances innovation and adaptation at both the subsystem and 
system levels (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2002). Limited constraints imposed by other subsystems 
boost the rate of innovation by autonomous units (Campbell, 1969, cited in Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 2002), and architectural innovation generates opportunities for recombination 
across the entire system (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Since its first steps in product diversification, early in its history, the company’s top 
management had fostered modular design in the form of independent companies, at first for 
every product line, and since 1976, for product clusters grouped in highly autonomous 
divisions. Moreover, the divisions were divided into separate business units. Three interviewees 
remarked that, while the divisions broadly shared a common “Lujan culture,” their evolution 
was divergent in structure, systems and style, as these characteristics were a consequence of 
                                              
10 This impression was shared by two interviewees.  
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division leaders’ own idiosyncrasy. Interdivisional unit communication and interdependence 
was very low until the late nineties.  Recently, despite more formal control and centralized 
resource allocation, the divisions retained their autonomy in marketing, and operations. 
Standardization. Despite its high growth, the company maintained its commitment to the car 
component industry, concentrating the units’ broad product offerings among a small set of 
shared customers and under a common brand, two factors that foster standardization (Galunic 
and Eisenhardt, 2001). The organizational initiatives initiated up until 1999 also included 
important efforts to standardize procedures. Corporate purchasing and logistics departments 
developed company-wide standardized procedures. Planning and control and information 
systems were unified throughout the company, and divisional managers were appointed to the 
corporate committee, giving them the opportunity to find out about the situation of the 
divisions managed by their peers.  Finally, human resources policies  were unified for every 
unit under the company’s strategic control. 
Recombination. A partial solution to the dilemma of how to secure the advantages of 
exploration without losing the benefits of exploitation is to recombine elements of existing 
partial solutions (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999) by manipulating the interdependencies 
between different activities. A recombination strategy allows whole blocks of existing solutions 
to be changed, rather than modifying them piecemeal, thus exploiting knowledge without being 
trapped by it. In this way, the company acts following a “logic of opportunity” in the use of its 
resources (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2003) and obtains inter-temporal economies of scope 
(Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2001) arising from the replacement of old businesses that used a 
particular resource by a new business that uses that resource in response to changing market 
conditions. Helfat and Eisenhardt (2001) suggest that inter-temporal economies of scope could 
also be obtained by reassigning particular functional areas to a new business, an approach that 
would require a matrix type of organization.  
Lujan’s recently created matrix organization has been conceived in a way that facilitates the 
recombination of changing business opportunities with manufacturing facilities worldwide for 
business units operating within each division. Operations managers have authority over plant 
activities worldwide and therefore are able to recombine operations’ locations and business 
opportunities in such a way as to provide a competitive cost to business unit managers within 
each division.  
Inter-unit collaboration. Recent ideas that have emerged under the “new managerial paradigm,” 
such as  Eisenhardt and Galunic’s (2000) idea of coevolving and the work of Chakravarthy et al. 
(2001), suggest that the superior results of knowledge-sharing projects spreads from the 
interested units towards those promoted and led directly by the corporate center.  Eisenhardt 
and Galunic (2000) state that the corporate offices that actually achieve synergies do not force 
collaboration but foster individual performance, letting businesses decide whether to work 
together as markets as the business evolves. Therefore, collaboration occurs only when two 
business unit managers believe that the links make sense for their respective businesses. The 
result is “a shifting web of relationships that exploits fresh opportunities for synergies and 
drops deteriorating ones” (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000). 
The matrix organization created by Lujan in 2000 included interdivisional functional 
committees designed to help divisional functional managers find a channel to explore 
opportunities for developing synergies through knowledge-sharing (e.g., interchanging best 
practices) and activity-sharing. The divisional managers interviewed reported their satisfaction 
with these committees’ performance, despite their relative novelty, and one of them stated that  
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the spirit of the committees’ objectives was not to increase bureaucracy but to “explore 
collaboration opportunities and, in particular, to prevent major mistakes due to lack of 
coordination.” The recent creation of corporate procurement and logistics departments and the 
centralization of R&D were initiatives resulting from the interdivisional Purchasing and 
Technology Committees’ proposals, in response to the corporate mandate to find new ways to 
lower costs in these areas. This behavior corresponds to the idea of “framed self-organizing,” 
through communication channels across groups, inspired by a small number of strict and 
simple rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). In Lujan’s case, these “rules” consisted of a broad 
but strict mandate to improve the static efficiency of these processes. At the top management 
level, collaboration was also fostered by letting top divisional managers join the Executive 
Committee. Finally, at the employee level, inter-organizational communication was promoted 
through the issuance of a written version of the corporate Mission, Strategy, Objectives and 
Shared Values, and the development of a company-wide intranet to reinforce communication 
(e.g., advertising job opportunities in the company) and a corporate magazine. 
Performance metrics led by corporate objectives. An organization’s set of performance metrics 
and structure has a significant influence on actors’ perceptions of their problem space. 
Performance metrics act as “attractors,” influencing actors’ attention to different facets of the 
company’s environment. Only by offering a fresh perspective through a shift in performance 
metrics and through periodic changes of structure is further improvement possible. In this way, 
through architectural redesign, the cognitive representations of divisional management may be 
altered to make them fit with the new corporate priorities. 
During the two periods of “long jumps,” the company’s metrics had fostered the achievement of 
ambitious sales targets, and had paid relatively little (though gradually increasing) attention to 
balance sheet items and strict cost control. During the last period, in contrast, corporate 
concentration on static efficiency was reflected in a new set of performance metrics aimed at 
biasing motivation toward cost awareness. Planning and Control tightened its grip by 
centralizing resource allocation between divisions and obliging them to justify very thoroughly 
their capital requirements, using financial tools such as discounted cash flows and financial 
ratios. Also, more granular metrics were developed, such as the implementation of a per-project 
income statement that enabled the company to fine-tune each individual project from tender to 
delivery. Finally, divisional directors’ variable remuneration began to be linked to corporate 
performance in order to enhance inter-unit collaboration. 
The abovementioned attributes identified at Lujan allow us to develop a model of architectural 
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Figure 3 














As Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001) remarked, standardization and modular design foster the 
development of recombination, whether by corporate initiative (when the decision involves 
several divisions) or by the division (if it affects only the division’s own business units). 
Recombination permits the company to obtain inter-temporal economies of scope by “moving” 
a resource across subsequent business opportunities. Additionally, modular design and 
standardization, together with the existence of channels for inter-unit communication and 
systems of management evaluation based on both business and corporate issues, enable the 
emergence of opportunities for collaboration at the unit level. These collaboration initiatives 
allow intra-temporal economies of scope, characterized by the simultaneous utilization of a 
resource across different units, in the form of knowledge and/or activity sharing. 
Both inter-temporal and intra-temporal economies of scope are sources of competitive 
advantage that the company obtains through architectural design. The important implication of 
our model, unlike previous work on the subject, is that corporate advantage is understood as 
the consequence of a company’s behavior not only at the corporate level but also at the 
divisional and business unit level. The corporate level sets the architecture that facilitates 
recombination and allows collaboration opportunities to arise, but the actual recombination 
and opportunities are self-generated by the different business and functional units working 
together. This conclusion supports Bowman and Helfat’s (2001) statement to the effect that 
corporate strategy is just a part of corporate impact on performance. As Lujan’s case shows, the 
corporate level does not get involved in direct initiatives aimed at obtaining synergies, but 
plays an indirect role by developing organizational arrangements that help units to identify and 
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These arguments allow us to conclude that the impact of corporate strategy on a firm’s 
performance is crucial. Through the Lujan story we can observe unmistakably how the 
company’s three radical transitions, which notably impacted on Lujan’s evolution from its 
position as “national champion” in Spain to its current status of global competitor, were led by 
corporate management. Our discussion also shows clearly that the Corporate Strategy Triangle 
provides a good lens to observe in more detail how the corporate level actually performs 
this role.  
Our exploratory work suggests that there are three crucial challenges for corporate managers of 
firms facing radical environmental change. First, realize the need to modify their cognitive 
representation or “theory” of the business. Second, develop a set of corporate strategic 
initiatives that pace the firm, either toward “off-line” long-jumps, such as strategic alliances or 
real options, or toward local search processes, when environmental dynamism decreases 
temporarily as a result of economic slowdown. Finally, architectural design reconciles the need 
for coordination with the need for rapid response through organizational arrangements that 
foster and ease self-organized collaboration at the interdivisional level. These structural designs 
acknowledge that firms are complex, adaptive systems and, consequently, must be managed 
according to the properties of such systems.   
This work also helps to illustrate the inadequacy of an often repeated statement about corporate 
strategy, derived from mainstream research: that corporate strategy exists only in diversified 
firms. This sometimes implicit assumption led to studies that sought to identify the sources of 
corporate performance by isolating company, industry and corporate effects. Lujan would 
qualify as a car component manufacturer, i.e. a single business company. However, as this 
account shows, Lujan actually has a corporate decision level that has had a crucial impact on 
its long-term survival and performance.  
Further research could aim at systematizing the analysis of the Corporate Strategy Triangle with 
the help of agent-based models. In this way, the relationships between cognition, strategic 
initiatives and architectural design could be described and understood more thoroughly. For 
instance, issues such as the performance impact of different corporate styles and different 
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